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Abstract Nodes of sensor networks may be resource-constrained devices, of-
ten having a limited lifetime, making sensor networks remarkably dynamic
environments. Managing a cryptographic protocol on such setups may require
a disproportionate effort when it comes to update the secret parameters of new
nodes that enter the network in place of dismantled sensors. For this reason,
the designers of schemes for sensor network are always concerned with the need
of scalable and adaptable solutions. In this work, we present a novel elliptic-
curve based solution, derived from the previously released cryptographic pro-
tocol TAKS, which addresses this issue. We give a formal description of the
scheme, built on a two-dimensional vector space over a prime field and over
elliptic curves, where node topology is more relevant than node identity, al-
lowing a dynamic handling of the network and reducing the cost of network
updates. We also study some security concerns and their relation to the related
discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves.
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1 Introduction
The Topology Authenticated Key Scheme (TAKS) is a cryptographic proto-
col, proposed in [22,24] for the first time and successively generalised [17,
18,23], providing security over a resource-constrained network (typically ad-
hoc networks, e.g. sensor networks for monitoring services). Its authentication
mechanism is based on node topology rather than on node identity, due to
the limited lifetime of nodes in a resource-constrained network. Indeed, while
nodes in infra-structured networks can rely on a external power supply and
on a stable planned maintenance service with human intervention, the nodes
in ad-hoc networks can rely only on their own battery or some other energy
harvesting mechanism, and maintenance services are usually remotely per-
formed without human intervention. When an off-duty node is replaced with
a new node, the new node identity enters in the network, but node topology
remains unchanged and the authentication mechanism does not need any up-
dating. Other examples of network-based key pre-distribution schemes may be
found in [1,2,8,14,15]. Vector spaces, rather than scalars, are introduced to
allow the setup of a truly scalable point-to-multipoint communication sessions,
hence without setting up multiple point-to-point sessions: the added dimen-
sionality introduces a further degree of freedom for the CA in the procedure of
parameters computation and assignment. From an engineering point of view,
point-to-multipoint sessions provide a relevant feature, especially for clustered
networks, where time syncronisation in data transmission is required as well
as lighter memory storage: point-to-multipoint sessions avoid traffic flooding,
hence wasting of energy, when maintenance services are activated on such
clustered networks (e.g. the updating of some configuration parameters in a
specific portion of the network).
The scheme we propose in this paper, called Elliptic Curve based Topology
Authenticated Key Scheme (ECTAKS), is derived from TAKS and is defined as
a hybrid deterministic Key Establishment Protocol (KEP) over elliptic curves,
and is designed to establish both point-to-point and point-to-multipoint secure
links among nodes. Security features of ECTAKS may include confidentiality
(data encryption), data integrity and sender authentication (signature). Other
examples of hybrid KEPs may be found in [9,10,16]. In ECTAKS the shared
secret is a symmetric key generated by each party involved in the commu-
nication session upon a successful authentication process, where each party
verifies if the other party belongs to its authenticated network. Such a net-
work is represented as a graph, where parties (network nodes) are the vertices
and the communication links are the edges. The assignment parameter to each
node is carried out by an external Certification Authority (CA); the scheme
parameter are successively preloaded into the nodes.
While TAKS [24] provides only key establishment facilities for point-to-point
communications by means of a Diffie-Hellman-like scheme and its generali-
sation [17] extends to point-to-multipoint sessions, the improvements imple-
mented in this paper directly provide ECTAKS with key establishment capa-
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bilities for both point-to-point and point-to-multipoint communications. More
importantly, elliptic curve cryptography allows achieving comparable security
levels using reduced key lenghts [7].
In this paper we provide a rigorous description of ECTAKS and address
a security analysis of the scheme. In this regard, we will show that ECTAKS
can be broken if an adversary can solve the intractable Discrete Logarithm
problem over elliptic curves, provided that it also manage to solve a linear
system of equations.
The paper is organised as follows: in Sec. 2 we introduce the notation and
some auxiliary results. The scheme is defined in Sec. 3, together with the
authenticated-encryption methods which is derived from it. The security anal-
ysis of the scheme is carried out in Sec. 4. Sec. 5 concludes the paper with
some considerations on open problems.
2 Notation
ECTAKS is a scheme based on elliptic curves as well as vector spaces over
finite fields. The networks of nodes where ECTAKS is built is modeled by
a graph. In order to provide a rigorous description of the scheme and of its
model, let us define the following elements.
Spaces Let p be a prime number, and let Fp be the finite field with p elements.
We denote by α
R
∈ Fp an uniformly random generated element in Fp. The
scheme presented is this paper is mainly based on the 2-dimensional vector
space (Fp)
2. Scalar elements in Fp are usually denoted by lower-case greek
letters, whereas vectors in (Fp)
2 are denoted by bold latin letters. Given two
vectors k = (α1, α2), t = (β1, β2) ∈ (Fp)2 we define the scalar product over Fp
of k and t as
k · t
def
= α1β1 + α2β2 ∈ Fp .
Elliptic curves Let q > 3 be the power of a prime number. An elliptic curve
over Fq is the abelian group of Fq-rational points satisfying a Weierstrass
equation [25], i.e.
C
def
= {(x, y) ∈ (Fq)
2 | y2 = x3 + ax+ b},
where a, b ∈ Fq. Throughout this paper we will denote by G ∈ C the generator
of a subgroup of C of order p, called the base point. Given a vector k =
(α1, α2) ∈ (Fp)2 and β1, β2 ∈ Fp we define
kG
def
= (G+G+ . . .+G︸ ︷︷ ︸
α1 times
, G+G+ . . .+G︸ ︷︷ ︸
α2 times
) = (α1G,α2G) ∈ C
2,
and
k · (β1G, β2G)
def
= α1β1G+ α2β2G ∈ C .
The following result is easily checked.
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Lemma 1 Let k, t ∈ (Fp)2. Then we have
(k · t)G = k · (tG).
Proof Let k = (α1, α2) and t = (β1, β2). Then
(k · t)G = (α1β1 + α2β2)G
= α1β1G+ α2β2G
= (α1, α2) · (β1G, β2G)
= k · (tG).
⊓⊔
We assume the security of the scheme we propose in this paper to be relying
on the following security assumption [11,21].
Problem 1 (ECDL problem) Let C be an elliptic curve over the finite
field Fq, let P ∈ C and m > 1. The (computational) Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm problem (ECDL problem) is the problem of finding the integer m
when the points P and mP are given.
Provided that the curve meets some well-established requirements (see e.g [4,
5,12,20]), the ECDL problem is assumed to be computationally intractable [3,
13]. For some overviews on algorithms solving the ECDL problem and related
problems, see e.g. [6,19].
Graphs A directed graph is a pair of sets (V,E), where V 6= ∅ and E ⊆ V ×V .
We call arrows the elements of E, and for each arrow e = (i, j) ∈ E we denote
the tail of the arrow as t(e)
def
= i and the head of the arrow as h(e)
def
= j. In
order to keep the notation cleaner, we will sometimes denote the arrow (i, j)
by writing “i − j”. If i, j ∈ V , we say that i and j are connected in (V,E) if
(i, j) ∈ E and (j, i) ∈ E.
3 The scheme
The Elliptic Curve Topology Authenticated Key Scheme (ECTAKS) is a cryp-
tographic protocol based on a network of users who want to communicate
with each others. The network is modeled by means of a graph where users
are represented as nodes. Two users can communicate if and only if they are
connected in the corresponding graph. The communication between two users
can start if they manage to exchange a shared secret which can be used to
instantiate a Diffie-Hellman-like protocol. In this setting, if the arrow from
node i to node j exists, then user i is allowed to start a communication ses-
sion with user j. The external CA assigns a set of parameters, called Local
Configuration Data (LCD), to each node of the network. For each node, LCD
is composed by two secret components, that remain unchanged once gener-
ated, and a public component, which is updated every time a new node joins
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the dynamic network. With respect to classical solutions of key-assignment
schemes on network, the scheme proposed in this paper does not only rely
on pre-distribution of keys in nodes. Indeed, the proposed protocol is rather
based on a dynamic assignment of the public components to each node and on
a static assignment of secret components. The shared secret in ECTAKS is in
fact a function of both sender and receiver private key components, while in
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman-like schemes the shared secret is usually a function
of the complete sender private key and the receiver public key. Moreover, the
CA generates LCD in such a way communications among nodes are allowed
only if their topology is compliant to the planned network topology.
3.1 Parameter definition
Let N be a positive integer and let V
def
= {1, 2, . . . , N}. The authenticated
network topology is a symmetric directed graph ANT = (V,E), i.e. a graph
where E ⊂ V × V and if (i, j) ∈ E, then (j, i) ∈ E. We furthermore assume
that ANT is loop-free, i.e. without cycles of length 1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
ANTi = (Vi, Ei) is the (non-symmetric and cycle-free) directed subgraph of
ANT such that
Ei
def
= {e ∈ E | t(e) = i} and Vi
def
= {i} ∪ {h(e) | e ∈ Ei}.
In the point of view of our application, ANTi is the subgraph of the users
which user i is entitled to communicate to. An example of network topology
network is depicted in Fig. 1.
i
Fig. 1 An example of ANT, where red nodes represent ANTi.
Let us now denote by C an elliptic curve over Fq, where q > 3, and G ∈ C
is the base point, whose order is prime number p. From now on we will assume
p >> N . Once the ANT has been established, the CA is in charge of the
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assignment of the scheme parameters to each node. For each node i ∈ V , its
assigned local configuration data LCDi = (Si,Pi) is such that
Si
def
= {ki, ti} and Pi
def
=
{
mi−jG
}
j∈Vi\{i}
,
where ki ∈ (Fp)2 \ {0} is called the local key component corresponding to the
node i, ti ∈ (Fp)2 \ {0} is called the transmitted key component corresponding
to the node i, and mi−jG ∈ C
2 \{0} is called the topology vector correspond-
ing to the arrow (i, j). The component Si represents the private information
assigned to node i, whereas Pi represents its public information.
The CA assigns the parameters to each node in a sequential way, once it has
chosen an arbitrary root node for each connected component of the graph.
Starting from the parameters assigned to the root node, the CA computes the
parameters for the other nodes of the graph according to some constraints
which allow each pair of topologically admissible nodes to compute a shared
secret, that we called Elliptic Curve Topology Authenticated Key (ECTAK).
3.2 Parameter assignment and shared secrets
For sake of simplicity the root node where parameter assignment starts is here
assumed to be node 1.
Node 1 The parameters k1 and t1 are generated randomly from (Fp)
2 \ {0}
and assigned to the secret component S1 of node 1.
Node 2 Let us assume that the second node chosen by the CA is node 2 in V1.
Then, the parameter m1−2 is generated randomly by the CA, provided that
k1 ·m1−2 6= 0, and the corresponding topology vector m1−2G is appended to
the public component P1 of node 1. Notice that CA can generate a random
vector until the previous condition is satisfied. Once the topology vector related
to the arrow (1, 2) has been defined, the parameter generation for node 1 is
complete and the parameters for node 2 can be defined running the following
steps:
– the parameter k2 is randomly chosen by the CA from the solutions of the
linear equation
k1 ·m1−2 = k2 · t1 (1)
and it is assigned to node 2;
– the parameter m2−1 related to the arrow (2, 1) is generated randomly,
provided that
k2 ·m2−1 6= 0;
the corresponding topology vector m2−1G is assigned to node 2;
– t2 is randomly chosen by the CA from the solutions of the linear equation
k2 ·m2−1 = k1 · t2 (2)
and it is assigned to node 2.
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At the end of this process the CA has assigned:
– S1 = {k1, t1}, P1 = {m1−2G} to node 1,
– S2 = {k2, t2} and P2 = {m2−1G} to node 2.
Assume now that node 1 wants to start a session with node 2. Then node 1
and node 2 can agree on an ephemeral shared secret, performing the following
operations:
– node 1 generates a random non-zero element α
R
∈ Fp;
– node 1 sends αt1G to node 2;
– node 1 defines ECTAK1−2
def
= αk1 · (m1−2G).
Now node 2 can compute
k2 · (αt1G) = (k2 · αt1)G = (αk1 ·m1−2)G = αk1 · (m1−2G) = ECTAK1−2,
where the second equality is obtained from Eq. (1). Consequently node 1 and
node 2 have shared the non-zero secret ECTAK1−2 ∈ C. Similarly, node 2 can
agree with node 1 on the shared secret
ECTAK2−1
def
= αk2 · (m2−1G) = k1 · (αt2G),
where α is again an ephemeral random chosen non-zero element in Fp generated
by node 2, and the second equality is derived from Eq. (2).
Node 3 Assume now that node 1 wants to agree on a shared secret with an-
other node in V1, e.g. node 3. Then the secret component S1 of node 1 remains
unchanged and, proceeding as for node 2, the parameter m1−3 is generated
randomly by the CA, provided that k1 · m1−3 6= 0, and the corresponding
topology vector m1−3G is appended to the public component P1 of node 1.
Once the topology vector related to the arrow (1, 3) has been defined, the pa-
rameters k3, m3−1 and t3 for node 3 can be defined proceeding as for node 2.
At the end of this process the secret and public components are respectively
– S1 = {k1, t1} and P1 = {m1−2G,m1−3G} for node 1, and
– S3 = {k3, t3} and P3 = {m3−1G} for node 3.
Consequently, as in the case of the shared secret between node 1 and node 2,
node 1 and node 3 can share the non-zero secret
ECTAK1−3
def
= αk1 · (m1−3G) = k3 · (αt1G),
where α is an ephemeral random chosen non-zero element in Fp generated by
node 1. Similarly, node 3 can agree with node 1 on the shared secret
ECTAK3−1
def
= αk3 · (m3−1G) = k1 · (αt3G),
where α is again an ephemeral random chosen non-zero element in Fp generated
by node 3.
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Generic node j In the general case, suppose that the CA has generated Si =
{ki, ti} for node i, as described above, and i wants to agree on a shared secret
with node j in Vi. Then, the parametermi−j is generated randomly by the CA,
provided that ki ·mi−j 6= 0, and the corresponding topology vector mi−jG
is appended to the public component Pi of node i. Once the topology vector
related to the arrow (i, j) has been defined, the parameters for node j can be
defined running the following steps:
– the parameter kj is randomly chosen by the CA from the solutions of the
linear equation
ki ·mi−j = kj · ti (3)
and it is assigned to node j;
– the parameter mj−i related to the arrow (j, i) is generated randomly, pro-
vided that
kj ·mj−i 6= 0;
the corresponding topology vector mj−iG is assigned to node j;
– tj is randomly chosen by the CA from the solutions of the linear equation
kj ·mj−i = ki · tj (4)
and it is assigned to node j.
At the end of this process we have that
– Si = {ki, ti} and mi−jG is appended to Pi for node i, and
– Sj = {kj , tj} and mj−iG is appended to Pj for node j.
Assume now that node i wants to start a session with node j. Then node i
and node j can agree on an ephemeral shared secret, performing the following
operations:
– node i generates a random non-zero element α
R
∈ Fp;
– node i sends αtiG to node j;
– node i defines ECTAKi−j
def
= αki · (mi−jG).
Now node j can compute
kj · (αtiG) = (kj · αti)G = (αki ·mi−j)G = αki · (mi−jG) = ECTAKi−j ,
where the second equality is obtained from Eq. (3). Consequently node i and
node j have shared the non-zero secret ECTAKi−j ∈ C. Similarly, node j can
agree with node i on the shared secret
ECTAKj−i
def
= αkj · (mj−iG) = ki · (αtjG),
where α is again an ephemeral random chosen non-zero element in Fp generated
by node j, and the second equality is derived from Eq. (4).
Remark 1 For each (i, j) ∈ E, the component mi−j , which is generated by
the CA in order to define the public component mi−jG, is not accessible by
any user (belonging or not to the network), unless they can solve the ECDL
problem, as better explained in Section 4.
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Remark 2 When the session between node i and node j has timed out or is
not anymore valid, node i and node j can again agree on a disposable shared
secret by selecting a new random parameter α. The same happens if node
i is damaged and needs to be replaced by another sensor. The CA assigns
to the new node i the same secret parameter of the former node i, and the
communication with node j is again established by selecting a new random
parameter α.
Remark 3 The parameter assignment is highly scalar-product based. For this
reason, it is important to point out that for each i, j ∈ V , the products of
Eq. (3) defining ECTAKi−j are uniformly distributed over Fp \{0}, since, by
definition, its inputs are non-zero elements of (Fp)
2. Moreover, the secret com-
ponents ki and ti can be chosen from the p solutions of Eq. (3) and Eq. (4)
respectively. In other words, the constraints defined in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4)
reduce the complexity of guessing the secret component ki (respectively ti)
from p2 to p, since the value to be guessed needs to satisfy a linear equation.
However, this does not represent a security issue since the parameter p is cho-
sen to be a secure parameters, therefore the security of the scheme should rely
on the size of p and not on the size of p2.
3.3 ECTAK-based authenticated encryption
We show here a classical way to provide authenticated encryption, using the
ECTAK as shared secret. In the following we denote by H and KDF a keyed
hash function and a key-derivation function respectively, whereas Enck and
Deck respectively denotes the encryption and the decryption procedures using
the key k of a symmetric encryption method, where Deck = Enc
−1
k .
Assume now that node 1 wants to send a signed encrypted message m to node
2. Then node 1 performs the following operations:
– generates α
R
∈ Fp \{0};
– computes ECTAK1−2
def
= αk1 · (m1−2G);
– computes (k1, k2)
def
= KDF(ECTAK1−2, αt1G);
– computes c
def
= Enck1(m);
– computes s
def
= H(k2, c);
– sends (αt1G, c, s) to node 2,
where the size of m, c and s suits respectively the domain of encryption and
hash functions.
Node 2 can perform the following steps:
– computes k2 · (αt1G) = ECTAK1−2;
– recovers (k1, k2) by computing KDF(ECTAK1−2, αt1G);
– recovers m computing Deck1(c);
– checks that s = H(k2, c).
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4 Considerations on security
In this section we present some security properties of the scheme. We will
show, in Theorem 1, in which way an attacker can successfully determine the
secret parameters of a target node i. We will prove that, in order the attack
to be successful, the attacker needs to recover the secret information of at
least two nodes connected to node i. The success probability of the attack is
calculated in Theorem 2. The attack relies on the ability of the attacker to
solve an instance of the intractable ECDL problem. To the best of our current
state of knowledge, it is not possible to provide a formal reduction from one
problem to the other.
Let us now prove our result showing that if an attacker can solve the
ECDL problem and can recover the secret components Sj and Sk, for some
nodes j, k ∈ Vi connected to i, then it can recover Si only if an algebraic
condition on the coordinates is satisfied. In particular, from this follows that
compromising one and only node is not enough to recover Si. Without any
loss of generality, let us denote by node 1, node 2 and node 3 the three nodes
previously mentioned. Let us assume that node 1 is targeted by the attacker,
which has successfully recovered data from node 2 and node 3. Moreover, to
further simplify, let us assume ANT1 = (V1, E1), where V1 = {1, 2, 3} and
E1 = {(1, 2), (1, 3)}, as depicted in Fig. 2.
1
32
Fig. 2 The network targeted by the attacker, where the target node 1 is highlighted.
We assume that LCD2 = {(k2, t2),m2−1G} and LCD3 = {(k3, t3),m3−1G}
are known to the attacker aiming at recovering k1, t1 ∈ LCD1, recalling that
m1−2G,m1−3G are publicly available.
(k2 · t1)G = k1 · (m1−2G)
(k1 · t2)G = k2 · (m2−1G)
(k3 · t1)G = k1 · (m1−3G)
(k1 · t3)G = k3 · (m3−1G).
Since the attacker has access to an algorithm which solves the ECDL problem,
it can access m1−2 = (a13, a14) and m1−3 = (a33, a34). Therefore, denoting
by k2 = (a11, a12), t2 = (a23, a24), k3 = (a31, a32) and t3 = (a43, a44), the
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previous equations correspond to the following system in the unknowns t1 =
(x1, x2) and k1 = (x3, x4):


(a11x1 + a12x2 − a13x3 − a14x4)G = 0
(a23x3 + a24x4)G = b2G
(a31x1 + a32x2 − a33x3 − a34x4)G = 0
(a43x3 + a44x4)G = b4G,
(5)
where b2 = k2 ·m2−1 and b4 = k3 ·m3−1. Therefore, denoting by
A
def
=


a11 a12 −a13 −a14
0 0 a23 a24
a31 a32 −a33 −a34
0 0 a43 a44

 , (6)
b
def
= (0, b2, 0, b4)
t and x
def
= (x1, x2, x3, x4)
t, the system in Eq.(5) is equivalent
to the linear equation
Ax = b. (7)
Theorem 1 Let Adv be an adversary then can solve the ECDL problem. If
det(A) 6= 0, then Adv can recover S1.
Proof Since the adversary can solve the ECDL problem, it can build the system
Ax = b of Eq.(7). The result trivially follows, since det(A) 6= 0 implies that
the system admits one and only one solution. ⊓⊔
Remark 4 Notice that, due to the requirements on the LCD on each node, the
first and the second row of A are linearly independent, and the same holds
for the third and the fourth. If Adv can access the secret components of two
nodes, then, since rk(A|b) = rk(A) ∈ {2, 4}, the system in Eq.(5) as at least
one solution. Moreover, if rkA = 2, the system admits p2 solutions, then the
method of Theorem 1 leads to an attack to the scheme with success probability
1/p2. Indeed, if the attacker selects one of the p2 − 1 solutions of the system
which do not match the correct secret component of node 1, then the attempted
impersonation attack is easily disclosed in the authenticated-encryption phase
of the protocol (see Sec. 3.3). The same holds if only one node is compromised
by Adv, since only two equations of the system are known.
We will now show that the success probability of the attack described in
Theorem 1 approaches 1 when the prime p is sufficiently large.
Theorem 2 Let Sp be the probability that Adv successfully recovers the secret
component of S1 using the method of Theorem 1. Then
lim
p→∞
Sp = 1.
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Proof Let us recall that, for each parameter assignment in a scheme with 3
nodes, we can construct a matrix as in Eq. (6). We call such a matrix an
admissible matrix for the scheme. Let us denote by Ap be the set of matrices
in (Fp)
4×4 which are admissible, and by Ip the subset of those which are
invertible. Then we have
Sp =
#Ip
#Ap
>
#Ip
p12
. (8)
Let us now count #Ip. The parameters k1 and t1 are chosen randomly in
(Fp)
2 \ {0}, whereas m1−2 ∈ (Fp)2 \ {0} is chosen such that k1 ·m1−2 6= 0.
The coefficient k2 is chosen such that k2 · t1 6= 0, since k2 · t1 = k1 ·m1−2.
Notice that, if t1 = (x1, x2), then we need to rule out from the possible choices
of k2 = (a11, a12) those which satisfy a11x1 = −a12x2. This reduces to p2 − p
the possibilities for the vector k2. Now, m2−1 can be chosen making sure that
k2 ·m2−1 6= 0. Since k2 is not fixed, we have p2− 1 possible choices for m1−2.
Analogously, t2 can be chosen in p
2 − p ways, since the value k1 = (x3, x4) is
fixed and k1 · t2 6= 0. Hence, if the solution (x1, x2, x3, x4) ∈ (Fp)4 is fixed, we
obtain k2, t2,m2−1 in (p
2−p)2(p2− 1) way. The same holds when considering
k3, t3,m3−1. Noticing that in this argument we are using the fact that the
constructed matrix is invertible, since we are assuming that (x1, x2, x3, x4) is
the unique solution of the problem, we obtain
Ip = (p
2 − p)4(p2 − 1)2 =
(
#GL(2, p)2
)
(p2 − p)2.
The result follows from Eq. (8), considering the limit for p→∞. ⊓⊔
Notice that ECTAKS can be defined over an Fp-vector space of dimension
d > 2 similarly to the way it was built in Section 3 for an Fp-vector space
of dimension 2, and Theorems 1 and 2 can be extended to the d-dimensional
case as well. In particular, it is possible to construct a 2d×2d triangular block
matrix A that, for a large p, is invertible with probability close to 1. Moreover,
an attacker who can solve the ECDL problem can successfully determine the
secret parameters of a target node i, provided that it can recover the secret
components of at least d nodes connected to node i and det(A) 6= 0.
5 Conclusion and future works
In this paper we have introduced the protocol ECTAKS, derived from [24] and
here adapted to the case of elliptic-curve cryptography. We have studied some
security issues of the scheme, with a focus on the underlying ECDL problem.
We have proven that, even though the secret and public components of the
scheme are linked by means of linear equations, an attacker who wants to make
use of the linear algebra method (explained in Sec. 4) to recover the secret
components to a target node needs to be able to solve the ECDL problem and
to access the secret components of at least two nodes connected to the target
node. Although at the time of writing we understand that the scheme lacks
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of a general and complete security proof, the search for an argument showing
that an attack to ECTAKS can be converted into an attack to the underlying
ECDL problem remains open.
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